Should the U.S. lower the drinking age to 18 Research Paper

Should the U.S. lower the drinking age to 18 - Research Paper Example In the 1970s , the drinking age was reduced to 18 , as this was followed by many of the states so that the individuals be given the right under the Twenty Sixth Amendment passage. There are some states which give the permission to the 18 year olds to be present in the places where alcohol beverages are consumed , even if they are not consuming the beverages themselves and sometimes even give them the permission to work as bar tenders , serving the beverages. Whereas there are some states which give the permission to the 21 year olds to consume the alcohol beverages on the private property with the permission or the supervision of a family member. (Williams, Elizabeth M, and Stephanie J. Carter. The A-Z Encyclopedia of Food Controversies and the Law. Santa Barbara, Calif: Greenwood/ABC-CLIO, 2011.) Despite the specific changes made by the federal law there are about thirty states within the United States which give the permission to the individuals of the 21 years age or over to consu me the alcohol under the supervision of a family member or with the consent of their parents. ... lif: Greenwood/ABC-CLIO, 2011.) There have been many arguments and the debates that the minimum age of drinking should be reduced so that so that the individuals have the responsibility and staring at an early age will broaden their horizon to the responsible drinking. Amethyst Initiative , which are one of the groups of college educators, have agreed and given the advocacy of the underage drinking. National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism College Drinking Task Force, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving , on the other hand have urged and they advocate rigorously against the reduction of the underage drinking so that the fatal consequences such as the alcohol related traffic incidents , alcohol related traffic deaths and alcohol related sexual assaults can be reduced and it can only be done with the help of the minimum drinking age laws enforcements on the campuses and the schools. For the policy makers in the United States, the underage drinking has been a well debated issue in the country and there have been various laws introduced and changed over the past many years as well. Due to the increase in the drunk driving fatalities , the United States government increased the drinking age from 18 years to 21 years so that the fatality rate could be decreased. There have been arguments put forth which question that what reasons have resulted in the underage drinking to be reduced to 18. There are some critics who criticize the current drinking age which differentiates and arbitrarily discriminates between the individuals who are 21 years old and the individuals who are 18 years old. In the country like United States, the individual who is 18 years old is regarded as the legally adult, and hence has the freedom to join military , have the capability and ability to

Riordan Process Improvement Plan Essay Example for Free

Riordan Process Improvement Plan Essay Time is always moving forward making it difficult to execute daily processes slowly. Travelling is a daily process that takes much time and resources. Time spent on travelling can be known as waste time as the main goal is to transport from point A to point B without analyzing or performing actions on other tasks. Multitasking is not advisable meaning a high focus should be on the road and other road users plus it is illegal. The process if done as quickly as possible can reduce the cycle time leaving extra time for more profitable processes. The activity to drive from home to office is graphically shown below in the form of a flowchart. Currently time taken to execute the activity is not efficient. Certain processes are occupying heavier proportion from the total cycle time. A process improvement plan is drawn not only to analyze and reduce current time but also not forgetting to achieve a safe trip. Statistical Process Control Data below tabulates five weeks of travelling time from home to office. The next step is to deduce whether the data is efficient by running a test. Statistical process control (SPC) tests random samples from processes to determine the productivity is perfectly efficient (Chase, Jacobs Aquilano, 2006). The test graphically depicts the upper control limit (UCL) and lower control limit (LCL) of each the average mean and average range graphs. Average of time taken and range from each week in combination with the range and average factors are requirements to calculate both limits. Graphs with the limits first, plot the weekly average mean and average range. Observation is made from the graphs to decide on whether or not all sample data is within the control limits. The sample data that either is higher than the UCL or lower than the LCL will be the overuse time. Value of data is not only under observation but also the pattern of the chart is also under monitoring. The pattern of a stable chart is sample data closely plotting around the mean data. Patterns that exhibit an increase toward the UCL or decrease toward the LCL or erratic behavior must undergo investigations (Chase et al., 2006). The both chart depicts that the average of total time and range is within the UCL and LCL. The observation only concludes that the current data is allowable but not perfectly efficient. The pattern of the data in the average mean chart depicts a run of three plots above central line. The practice to avoid the first week’s traffic congestion is to leave from home reaching office exactly at 9.00 a.m. The second and third week changes practice as work is piling up and requires more setup time. The pattern of the data in R chart depicts an increase. The final plot reaches a range nearly to the UCL. The reason is the zero value recording of total cycle time on Monday. Seasonal Factors The data above is in normal tabulation manner meaning no trips involving external variables or environmental factors intervention is taken into consideration. External variables present itself in seasonal or cyclic durations. The latter is easily taken into consideration as the operation time is constant but the former makes it harder to analyze any given length of duration. Seasonal usually associates with duration of the year involving particular activities (Chase et al., 2006). The trip from home to office is  under different seasonal influences. The fasting period of the Muslims is a major influence in the trip. Traffic is much lighter not only for the trip to the office but also from the office especially on the weekends.. Vehicles on the main route and highway are less reducing driving time. The drive is much smoother requiring less petrol eliminating the duration to drive to the petrol station and fill petrol. Holiday’s season is another major influence in the trip. Academic institutes such as schools, colleges and universities are undergoing final examination. Institutes deem holidays reducing the morning. Vehicles belonging to school bus drivers, college or university students and instructors reduce allowing working adults to use the routes and highway freely. The current assumptions are made relying on past personal experience of the last five years. Finally observation relying on past personal experiences has shown that in the initial week traffic is at the highest at peak hours but reduces by the end of the month. Employees tend to stay late at office at the final week of the month mostly because of the need to complete monthly closing reports. Amount of cars reduces as the weeks run in a monthly cycle. Total cycle time needs to be as less and independent as possible. Cycle time that easily reacts under any influences will make decisions harder to conclude as observations are not consistent. Seasonal factor is the adjustable correctional value in a given time series of the season of the year. The table below records the seasonal factor that adjusts the next month’s cycle time to 300 minutes comparing to the current 347.14 minutes. Confidence Intervals Confidence intervals are brackets that the true population occur base on the confidence levels (NIST SEMATECH, n.d., para. 2). 95% is set as the confidence level for the above data. The sample size is below 15 and the chart below depicts the distribution of average mean for the five weeks being normal (University of Phoenix, 2010, Estimation and Confidence Intervals, p. 305). The distribution scale put to use is the t-distribution satisfying the above conditions. The interval that encloses the true population parameter in a 95% confidence level base on the current data is from 61.98% to 79.57%. Conclusion The process undergoing the plan records a nearly stable result from the (SPC) within the control limits, producing seasonal factors for next month forecast and nearly a high confidence interval for its confidence level. The process is still open for modifications as the plan has point out areas for improvements. The SPC pattern’s requires the data to be graphically stable, the average mean are not to be heavily leaning against the seasonal factors and the confidence interval must increase so that the quickest cycle time is achievable. References Chase, R. B., Jacobs, F. R., Aquilano, N. J. (2006). Operations management for competitive advantage (11th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill/Irwin. NIST SEMATECH (n.d.). What are Confidence Intervals? Product and Process Comparisons. Retrieved from http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/prc/section1/prc14.htm University of Phoenix. (2010). Statistical Techniques. Retrieved August 21, 2010 from University of Phoenix, QNT 561 – Applied Business Research Statistics

Data Collection and Individual Privacy :: Expository Exemplification Essays

Data Collection and Individual Privacy In deliberation of the topic of the use of individual information, the moral issue of importance is whether public or private sector entities have the right to create individual profiles of consumers and their obligation in protecting the consumer's privacy is in question. The exponential growth of the information age in particular the personal computer has created a situation where economies of the public and private sector are at odds with the privacy of the consumer or citizen. Should data collection agencies use or sell information collected about individuals? In my deliberation of this topic, I feel the consumer/citizen should possess the right of determining whom and in what form can data collection be allowed. I will look at the positions of proponents and advocates alike in making my ethical decision. The reasoning for this decision would be that, by allowing the individual the right to decide public and private sector entities would be acting in the best interest of society in a whole. This decision will be examined using the Utilitarian school of thought in ethics. John Stuart Mills defined the theory of Utilitarianism as "the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him/her to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. (Rachels 107)." In summation, the theory can be said to mean actions are to be deemed good or bad judgements based on their consequence. This consequence must provide the society or all individual involved the greatest amount of benefit. In turn this benefit must be the majority's benefit over the minorities. In viewing the issue of should data collection agencies use or sell information collected about individuals, the majorities I believe in this issue is the consumer/citizen and the minorities are public and private section entities. The influence of data collection or data profiling impacts the consumer citizen by far in comparison of the benefits of the public or private entity. The values to be considered are the values of health, discrimination, truth, and economics.

The term ‘stagnation’ was coined by the Gorbachevian discourse of the perestroika era to describe the situation in the Soviet Union from 1964-1985

The term ‘stagnation' was coined by the Gorbachevian discourse of the perestroika era to describe the situation in the Soviet Union from 1964-1985, under the rules of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. The assertion of ‘apparent' stagnation suggests some ambiguity from the outset as to the actual situation in the USSR. Indeed, some have suggested that the term is too simplistic – this idea is especially asserted by Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle in their recent reconsideration of the Brezhnev era. Nevertheless, when Gorbachev came to power he referred to a ‘pre-crisis' situation in the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the ‘stagnation' era did see social, economic and cultural changes which led to some deterioration in the USSR's situation, but improvement was not entirely excluded, certainly not for the whole period, thus to say that the Soviet Union was on the verge of crisis by 1985 can certainly be contested. Furthermore, the notion of ‘changes' is paradoxical when the era is marked by great conservatism. Consequently, there are many factors to debate in discussion of the assertion that ‘the period of apparent stagnation saw vital social, economic and cultural changes which by the early 1980s had brought the Soviet Union to the verge of crisis'. The economic situation by the early 1980s is perhaps the most powerful for suggesting the USSR verged on crisis. It seems implausible that the entire ‘stagnation' period to economic crisis for initially, recognition that the economy was doing badly and determination to achieve parity with the USA, led to Kosygin's 1965 reform programme. However, this was halted due to concern, bolstered by events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, that economic change could stimulate demands for political democratisation – economic conservatism would thereafter shape the period. The two chief sectors of the economy were agriculture and industry. On the one hand, agriculture received much budgetary expenditure, enabling prices to be kept down, stimulating consumption and the output of agricultural goods increases 1976-801. However, there were fundamental flaws in the system: subsidies were a burden for the state, nor did they stop the need for grain imports; furthermore, the inability to deal with weather conditions led to disastrous harvests 1979-812. Continued migration to the towns was also problematic. Failure was officially recognised in 1982 with the introduction of a Food Programme to ease food shortages, though according to Bialer, it was equally inefficient in mitigating the problem3. Bialer paints a similar picture of industry. While arguing that initially investments and production levels increased, as time went on, slow down set in4. Essentially, Bialer implies this was inevitable considering the lack of change in industrial policy5. Similarly, although Keep recognises moves towards scientific management, he stresses these had virtually ended by the early 1980s due to inefficient resources and reluctance of enterprise managers to adapt6 – inertia surrounded the system from all angles. As he states, ‘hoarding stocks, ‘storming' at month's end, and a reluctance to innovate would remain characteristic of the Soviet industrial scene until the era of perestroika'7. Perhaps crisis by the early 1980s was demonstrated by Japan's take-over as the world's second largest producer of industrial goods and services8 – considering the USSR's aim was to advance as a superpower, this was devastating. Finally, inefficiency seemed inevitable when, despite increasing absenteeism by the early 1980s and high labour turnover, punishments, such as sacking, did not exist to prevent it. On the one hand, to say that the economy was on the verge of a crisis is debateable. There had been some long-lasting improvements: expansion of the data-processing industry, an increase in electricity and expansions in the rail network and the automobile industry9 – there was hardly total stagnation of the economy. Harrison argues that by the early 1980s it was wrong to condemn the economy for it was still growing, despite a slower rate, government spending and revenues were controlled, and inflationary pressures were small10. However, even he acknowledges that ‘alarm bells were already ringing in the Kremlin when Brezhnev died'11. Overall, the economic situation by the early 1980s reveals that detrimental changes had occurred as the period progressed. Keep points to several factors by the mid-1980s which could cause a ‘pre-crisis situation' such as a declining rate of return on capital investment leading to a slower rate of GNP and industrial output, and a declining rate of gross industrial expansion. 12 Furthermore, people had more money than they had goods to buy, causing consumer frustration and increased savings. Similarly, the shadow economy was concerning, especially as despite supervisory organs to deal with it, it was increasingly tolerated, perhaps indicating the state's acknowledgement that their efforts would not stabilise the economy. Ultimately, economic improvement was stifled under Brezhnev because of his commitment to defence spending and his failure to reform the system by maintaining centralisation. Without change, even if not verging on crisis, surely the USSR was on the road – as Gooding states, ‘disaffection had not yet turned to revolt. Unless the economic tendency were reversed, however, crisis was inevitable'13. The same was to be the case under Andropov and Chernenko. On the one hand, Andropov believed economic expansion essential: his measures were to include a stamping down on absenteeism and low production. However, according to Service, ‘probably he did not wish to venture far along the route of reforms'14. In practice, although industrial output had increased by 5% from 1982-3, and the value of grain by 7%15 and although, as Harrison argues, growth slowdown had stopped by 198316, Andropov's caution prevented him from instigating fundamental change that could reverse the threat of a crisis. Finally, Chernenko's short term of office brought no improvement in the economic sphere. That social change brought the USSR to the verge of crisis by the early 1980s is debateable. Firstly, labour and living standards must be examined. The ‘social contract', whereby the worker had a poorly paid yet, in return, secure and easy work-life, may have led to economic inefficiency, but, as Hosking states, ‘as a social system†¦ worked well enough'17 – it created satisfaction and stability for much of the period. However, a change occurred when the contract broke down by the early 1980s, threatening stability. Gooding attributes this to the fact that people would react if the regime faltered on its promise of a better standard of life and ‘by now it was hard to hide that the period of steady improvement in living standards had ended'18 – shortages were widespread and, as he argues, while the black market eased the plight, it highlighted the level people had to go to to survive19. One major improvement was that, due to agricultural subsidies, by the early 1980s the rural-urban gap had narrowed as peasants became much better off. Gooding also stresses that because peasants were given internal passports and welfare benefits, ‘the regime had at last put them on an equal footing with other citizens'20. Keep does stress that ‘socially and culturally the gulf remained wide'21, hence the emigration to towns. Nevertheless, the up-side was that increasingly society became industrial, leading to Edwin Bacon's concept of ‘social revolution' with ‘an increasingly ‘modern' society†¦. urbanised, educated and professionalised'22 – illiteracy had largely disappeared and education improved. However, these improvements were to be self-constraining as the system proved unable to accommodate such advancements because the supply of jobs for an increasingly advanced population was incompatible. Several other factors demonstrate changes that could be deemed as contributing to a possible crisis. A falling rate of population growth in some regions by the early 1980s was worrying as was the declining life expectancy, linked to the under-equipped hospitals and poorly trained doctors. Keep also states that the incidence of serious diseases increased 1980-85 such as scarlet fever which rose by 21%23. The problem of alcohol, ironically worsened by the state's commitment to its production, was severe: Keep states that from 1980-5 newly reported cases of alcohol morbidity increased by 10%24 and, as a cause of absenteeism, crime and domestic violence, it created social upheaval in several respects. The ‘stagnation' period also saw increases in divorce, illegitimacy and abortion – indicators of a destabilising family situation, though some attempts were made to mitigate such crises in 1981 with pro-natalist measures such as improved maternity leave, creating, according to Keep, a recovery in the birth rate in the early 1980s25. Overall therefore, social change during the ‘stagnation' period presents a mixture of factors, making it difficult to assert definitively that it brought the USSR to the brink of crisis. On the one hand, Keep and Hosking point to disturbances that occurred in response to conditions such as housing and food supplies. However, that they constituted crisis is dubious as unrest was not organised and trade unions were constrained by the state. While Keep points to police and party controls, he also argues that most people had much to be happy about26. Indeed, throughout much of the period most people lived better than they had before: according to Gooding, despite shortages, meat milk and butter were more plentiful, improvements had been made regarding consumer goods, such as televisions, and although housing was still a problem, it had improved significantly27. Nevertheless, the end of the period saw a veritable decline in several respects. Most worrying was the scarcity of meat by 1982 – as Gooding concedes, ‘Lack of freedom could be put up with; lack of meat†¦ was a far more serious matter'28. On the one hand, as with the economic situation, it seems that the period after Brezhnev did see some move towards crisis abatement. Andropov laid great emphasis on social discipline and as Service states, police cracked down on drunkenness in the streets and punishments incurred for indiscipline at work29. Furthermore, Service believes that Andropov sincerely wanted to improve living standards and actually talked to workers30. However, whatever he learned did not transpire into change for the better – caution prevailed and therefore the possibility of crisis perpetuated. Overall, Keep argues that most citizens did not appreciate the seriousness of the country's problems by the mid-1980s, they even thought in some respects they lived better than in the West31. However, surely this delusion could not last forever, as the meat shortage was beginning to demonstrate. At the very least, if a direct social crisis was not looming by 1985, perhaps indirectly social problems were having an effect for, as Hosking states, they were undermining the economic strength of the USSR32. The cultural situation of the ‘stagnation' period saw many changes. Brezhnev ended Khrushchev's cultural ‘thaw' and brought a return to orthodoxy, epitomised by a gradual return to Stalin, reasserting the period's conservatism; according to Bialer, there was resistance to experimentation and alien ideas33. Bialer also points to other aspects of cultural policy including patriotism, the cult of Lenin, and from the mid-1970s, the cult of Brezhnev34. If such policies had been adhered to there would be no fear of cultural crisis. However, seeds of discontent were stirring and while repression prevented eruption in the short term, perhaps this perpetuated discontent rather than solved it. Firstly, some signs of instability emerged in popular culture. Keep argues that liberalization was needed to appease youths – discotheques and rock-and-roll appeared along with expression of some critical ideas such as the balladeer Vysotsky's blast of the gulag35. There was some increased suppression under Andropov, yet youth dissatisfaction expressed regardless; according to Keep this represented ‘the deep psychological malaise that afflicted the younger generation†¦ '36. The ‘stagnation' period also saw the rise of cultural nationalism. This represented a nostalgic mood with a return to early art, architecture and Russian religious philosophy37 and the establishment of an All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments which had grown substantially by the early 1980s38. Cultural nationalism also encompassed ‘village prose' writing which projected the idea that urban life, with its materiality, lacked value. That such writings had become relatively widespread leads Keep to state that ‘by the late Brezhnev era the system of literary controls had become more flexible'39. He also argues the same for visual arts. However, although Keep states that ‘by the mid-1980s cultural nationalism may be said to have struck root in the Russian popular consciousness', that it was subversive is unlikely considering the system of repression and censorship that could have suppressed it. In fact, Keep believed that ‘nationalism could provide the nomenklatura with†¦ [a] basis of support'40. Connected to this was nationalism within the republics. On the one hand, the era is characterised by equalisation and indigenisation; for example, in non-Russian republics, the top position went to someone of the titular nationality. This created stability for much of the period. However, Fowkes points to factors which stimulated national grievances: for example, from the late 1970s a greater stress was given to the Russian language, leading to accusations of Russification, and also the Russian monopoly over central institutions was maintained41. Fowkes even suggests that Brezhnev's national policy ‘contained the seeds of its own destruction'42 especially due to the ‘pervasive hidden opposition†¦ practised by almost every non-Russian national group' such as attempts to maintain traditional national cultures43. There were even some instances of popular national fronts. However, that such protests constituted crisis-point seems implausible. On the one hand, 249,000 Jews were allowed to emigrate between 1971-1980; yet this was not in response to internal crisis, more due to pressure from the USA – that the Jews were to prefigure the need for a general liberalisation was not true. Furthermore, as Fowkes points out, radical nationalists were a minority44. Crisis did come eventually but that in 1985 it was inevitable seems an over-exaggeration – essentially, repression kept nationalism under control, though its subtle presence could create long term problems. An examination of the cultural situation enables an evaluation of the level of open hostility that could have brought crisis. On the one hand, Keep refers to the emergence of ‘cultural opposition'45. True, there may have been informal discussions among academics, who also published works in the samizdat. However, there was a rigorous censorship system which suppressed freedom – history, social sciences and literature were often severely censored for subversive messages. Moreover, to progress in life, you had to conform. As Sandle argues, ‘The state deployed a whole variety of sanctions – sackings, harassment, public humiliations and coercing people into psychiatric hospitals†¦ '46. Ultimately, the goal was achieved: dissidence, though having thrived in the early 1970s, had basically disappeared by the 1980s – though also due to its internal divisions – hence stability within the regime seems plausible. However, there was also a grey area between conformism and dissent, an area which flowed underneath the surface, expressing non-orthodox views. This ‘loyal' opposition within the system itself, despite its silence, was essentially seditious, and as several have suggested, would ultimately create the ideas and personnel for perestroika. It was maintained by an informal network of discussions and a creative way of writing that expressed views without being overtly dissident – there was a determination, according to Sandle, that ‘the period of re-Stalinisation and retrenchment would not snuff out the spark of change and liberalisation that began in 1956'47. On the one hand, by the early 1980s critical opinions were becoming more overt. Elliot points to the workings of clandestine groups who disseminated leaflets criticising the authoritarian system though argues that, despite subversive messages, they would never threaten in practice because they were not widespread and because leaders were often arrested or exiled48. Overall, ‘loyal' opposition had to wait until after Brezhnev, at which point the beginnings of open reformist expression demonstrated that, despite prior suppression, discontent had remained. By 1985, perhaps it could be suggested that, had Gorbachev and glasnost' not come along, these intellectual ideas could have threatened a conservative regime – as Sandle states, this ‘diverse' intellectual life that had continued in silence became ‘an essential part of the destruction of the ‘citadel of dogmatism' after 1985'49. Nevertheless, it does seem that with active dissidence largely gone in the early 1980s, severe threats to stability were, if not fundamentally absent, then severely mitigated. In conclusion, that the apparent stagnation period brought the Soviet Union to the verge of crisis by the early 1980s is not an easy statement to evaluate. On the one hand, the masses were not privy to the information that Gorbachev was regarding the state of the USSR by 1985. On the popular level, therefore, perhaps crisis was not that imminent. Certainly, this connects to Elliot's idea that the stability of the regime was ‘apparently based more on passive toleration than active support'50. Furthermore, the concept of ‘stagnation' is very contentious; Sandle suggests that, as it was coined by perestroika reformers, it sprang essentially from their need to justify their ideas than perhaps being a true reflection of society51. Furthermore, that the stagnation period as a whole created a crisis situation by the early 1980s is exaggerated for it is consensus that deterioration came mid-way through the period, whether after Brezhnev became ill, or perhaps earlier, from events in Czechoslovakia. However, that conservatism was to dominate the era was fundamental – if it had meant the situation remained constant over the twenty years, there may have been no cause for concern; but conservatism ironically brought detrimental change. That this was inevitable is plausible considering the situation at the top – the period was certainly stagnant in this respect for Brezhnev's ‘stability of cadres' bred inertia, and despite personnel changes under Andropov, essentially the gerontocracy remained. Overall, social, economic and cultural changes that caused concern did occur. While crisis may not have been apparent at the time, especially as dissidence and discontent did not seem that widespread, perhaps all that was needed was a final push to bring the situation to a head. Ultimately, the situation probably hinged on the economy – as Gooding suggests, ‘economic failure would do in fact what continued oppression and arbitrariness were most unlikely to do: it would shake ordinary people out of their passivity. Therefore, failure to reform could only be safe for so long – as proponents of conservatism were dying out, so too was stability.

Acct451 Week 3

Companies Should not be Held Liable for Losses Sustained in a Successful Attack Made on Their AIS by Outside Sources. ACCT451 2013 I argue against the statement† Companies should not be held liable for losses sustained in a successful attack made on their AIS by outside sources. † There are several reasons for my contention. The Accounting Information Systems has been used by businesses to improve their recording, processing, and reporting of accounting information.At the same time it is the responsibility of the companies to adequately protect their information systems from outside sources. Since, the company benefits and consequently profits from the use of accounting information system, it should bear the losses that arise from attacks on the accounting information system. The argument in favor of the contention is that the accounting information system not only processes financial transactions to provide internal reports to managers but also does external reporting to outside parties such as stockowners, government and lenders.Since, it is essential that the accounting information system should be accessed by outsiders the system is particularly vulnerable to outside attacks (1). Still the onus of the security of its accounting information system clearly lies with the company and not with anyone else. It is a part of the business risk of a company. Consider the following example, a company maintains five distribution centers throughout the country. Each of these distribution centers may be attacked by robbers and looted. Who bears the loss?It is part of the business risk. The company cannot refuse to bear the losses. Similarly, if a company truck carrying goods to or from the company premises is attacked by robbers and is plundered, the company is responsible for the loss. It is another matter that the company may take out an insurance and the insurance company makes good the losses. However, the fact remains that the company pays premium for in surance and had there been no insurance, the company would have been forced to pay for the losses (2).The current accounting information systems bring tremendous benefits to companies. These generate several types of useful reports for the company, the company does not have to employ clerks to manually process accounting data, with a touch of a button information is generated, there are tremendous savings in costs, there is automatic payment and generation of important accounting documents, and there is efficiency in processing information. These benefits reduce costs for the companies and improve efficiency but come at a cost.One of the elements of the cost is that the accounting information system may be attacked from outside sources. Since the company enjoys these benefits, it must suffer the costs ( loss because of outside attack). A firm whose warehouses get destroyed by hurricanes do not absolve themselves of their losses because the hurricane is an outside source. Similarly, during war the premises of a firm may get bombed or hit by a missile, yet the company has to bear the loss (3). If an accounting information system is hit by outside sources there is a danger of fraud, virus attacks, or hackers.These risks have to be borne by the business as a part of its normal business risks. Further it is the responsibility of the company to maintain the highest level of security for its accounting information system. The physical security should be fool proof, authentication system should be the most advanced, virus protection should be the latest, and backup should be done at a safe place outside the premises. Such measures are required to ensure that attacks on the accounting information system like identity theft and loss of irreplaceable data do not take place.There are some institutions that are particularly vulnerable to outside attacks. For instance, the banks are vulnerable to outside attacks where the attackers seek to pilfer money using confidential in formation. In such cases, higher levels of authentication, and information security should be used. The fact that banks and financial institutions provide accounting information system based services, is a source of profits, these institutions are responsible for losses sustained by them (4).One of the most important features of most accounting information systems is the controls over the system and the security measures that the company implements If the company is not held responsible for the losses sustained by it because of outside attacks the company will avoid its responsibility for controls and security. It is also important that the quality of software used, the backup of data, and the people who are authorized to access the accounting information system are checked and tested.If the company is not held responsible for losses because of outside attacks the company will become lax in its essential functions related to the accounting information system. References: (1)Accounti ng Information Systems, Ulric J. Gelinas, Richard B. Dull E8 Cengage Learning, 2009 (2)Accounting Information Systems James A. Hall E6, Cengage Learning, 2008 (3)Accounting Information Systems Marshall B. Romney, Paul John Steinbart E10, Prentice Hall, 2005 (4)Information System Management, Ankita Bansal, Gyan Publishing House, 2002